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Abstract: Russians and Westerners access, process and communicate information in 
different ways. Whilst Westerners favour detailed analysis of subject matter, Rus-
sians tend to focus on certain components that are, in their view, significant. This 
disparity makes it difficult to achieve constructive dialogues between Western and 
Russian stakeholders contributing to cross-cultural communication problems.  The 
author claims that the difference in the ways Russians and Westerners negotiate 
information is a significant cultural difference between Russia and West rather than 
an irritating (and in principle amenable) lack of analytical skills on the Russian part-
ners’ part. Understanding the reasons behind the Russian-specific approaches to 
dealing with information would be a positive step towards a more effective cross-
cultural communication, important in business situations and essential in diplomacy.  
Keywords: Russians, post-Soviet Russians, cross-cultural communication, Russians 
and Westerners, communication problems 
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Macro-raisonnement et lacunes cognitives:  
les Russes postsoviétiques et les problèmes de communication interculturelle 
Résumé : Les Russes et les Occidentaux accèdent à, traitent et communiquent 
l’information de différentes façons. Alors que les Occidentaux préfèrent l’analyse 
détaillée de la matière, les Russes ont tendance à se concentrer sur certaines compo-
santes qui sont, à leur avis, importantes. Cette disparité rend difficile l’établissement 
de dialogues constructifs entre partenaires russes et occidentaux et contribue aux 
problèmes de communication interculturelle. L’auteur suggère que la différence 
dans la façon dont les Russes et les Occidentaux traitent l’information est une diffé-
rence culturelle significative entre la Russie et l’Occident plutôt qu’un manque irri-
tant de compétences analytiques sur la partie des partenaires russes – les compé-
tences que les Russes peuvent supposément apprendre. La compréhension des rai-
92      Elena FELL Macro-reasoning and cognitive gaps… 
sons qui sous-tendent les approches russes du partage de l’information serait une 
étape positive vers une communication interculturelle plus efficace, importante dans 
les situations commerciales et essentielle à la diplomatie. 
Mots-clés : russes, russes postsoviétiques, communication interculturelle, russes et 
les occidentaux, problèmes de communication 
*** 
Introduction 
Chronic communication failures between Western, predominantly English-
speaking stakeholders and their Russian counterparts are frustrating in business and 
alarming in diplomatic negotiations. These failures could be partly due to Western 
negotiators’ lack of understanding Russian specific cultural undercurrents that 
shaped Russian people’s communication styles, especially their leaders’.  
The aim of this paper is to explore Russian specific communication patterns by 
tapping into deeply rooted cultural stereotypes, which influenced the post-Soviet 
Russians’ social development during their formative years in the late XX century. 
The author claims that the understanding of that particular period is crucial for the 
understanding of the contemporary discourse that involves post-Soviet Russia be-
cause people who currently occupy leading positions in Russian society were 
brought up in the late XX century Soviet Union.  
This article contributes to ESSACHESS – Journal for Communication Studies, 
Special Issue “Rhetoric and Peace at Crossroads: Public and Civic Discourse, Cul-
ture and Communication Perspectives” as a practical attempt to counteract the peace 
threatening division between Russia and the West. Engaging theoretically with Rus-
sia’s important cultural traits that feed into Russian people’s specific communication 
behaviour could improve Western readers’ understanding of international communi-
cation situations that involve Russia. Inasmuch as this paper accounts for Russian 
people’s attitudes to their country and their identity as Russians this discussion is 
relevant to the Special Issue’s theme of “nationalism as cultural or political para-
digm of national identity”.  
In terms of communication behaviour that manifests culture-specific ways of ac-
cessing, processing and communicating information, when dealing with the matter 
in hand, Western traditions prescribe paying mindful attention to detail, meticulous 
planning and verbalisation of every possibility, acknowledgement of every fleeting 
phenomenon. Russians, on the other hand, practise the opposite approach: they lend 
their attention to what they consider important and worthy of attention, leaving out 
gaps of unacknowledged eventualities, circumstances and potentialities. These cog-
nitive lacunae, when confronted with Western negotiators’ expectations, cause ten-
sion in communication. Understatements, overstatements, conceptual leaps and 
patchy silences obscure important areas and leave the unexplained subject matter, 
which Westerners would normally want to acknowledge and duly address. 
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In order to capture the problematic difference between Russian and Western 
cognitive approaches to the matter in hand, which affects the quality of their inter-
cultural communication, the author suggests the terms “macro-reasoning” and “mi-
cro-reasoning”.  She draws on Tim Peake’s observation of the difference between 
the American and the Russian space suits to illustrate this point:  “The Russian space 
suit … doesn’t fit very well,” he says. “They’ve only got three sizes of glove [small, 
medium, large] so it is quite cumbersome and difficult to do tasks of high fidelity. 
Whereas the American suit has 46 sizes of glove…”  (Lougher, 2014). 
In the object where Americans find it appropriate to identify 46 features, Rus-
sians see only three. Westerners train their minds to explore subject matter in depth 
under a mental microscope, so to speak, whilst Russians tend to mentally condense 
reality into series of substantial, meaningful elements and disregard what they con-
sider trivial. Thus, a significant portion of reality remains verbally unacknowledged, 
and this is especially true of the dynamic fragments of reality (including social reali-
ty) and processes that Russians leave to unroll themselves. In Russian-style commu-
nication, many elements are just expected to happen, much of unacknowledged 
content is accepted by default, and this makes it difficult for outsiders to understand 
what exactly is happening in the Russian-speaking environment and why.  
It is tempting to suggest that once the above discrepancy is identified, it should 
be relatively easy to correct: detailed reasoning is an educable skill, and Russians 
would want to learn it as soon as this gap in their development is revealed.  Howev-
er, the author insists that macro-reasoning as a cognitive approach to reality is not an 
oversight of Russian education, but an entrenched feature of the Russian character 
that was purposefully taught, encouraged and nurtured during the course of the XX 
century and beyond.  
Drawing on the detailed analysis of various cultural and literary phenomena, the 
author aims to explain the mechanisms of social valorisation of Russian-style mac-
ro-reasoning and cognitive lacunae that are significant for evaluating communica-
tion situations.  
1. Russians versus cyborgs: callous rationality and emphatic intuition
Russian’s identity and perception of themselves qua Russians often fall back on 
the opposition between callous rationality and emotionally receptive, intuitive in-
sight. Russians attribute the latter to their own ways of negotiating reality and asso-
ciate the former with Western communication styles.  
This opposition, deeply entrenched in the Russian culture can be traced back to 
Russian folklore tales originated in the pre-Christian era (Zipes, 2012, p. 61) and 
collected by  Afanasyev between 1855 and 1863 (Afanasyev, 1855—1863).  
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In many of these tales, the intuition - rationality opposition takes the form of a 
conflict between Ivan the Fool, a young peasant with learning difficulties, and his 
older, “clever” brothers. In numerous stories, industrious and practically minded, 
Ivan’s brothers fail when they face an extraordinary and unexpected challenge. Ivan 
the Fool, aided by magical forces and using his own (inexplicable) insight, com-
pletes the challenge, wins a fortune and glorious, marries the princess. 
In Ivan the Fool narratives, both narrator’s and reader’s sympathies lie with Ivan, 
who breaks the rules and the monotony of ordinary respectable life, and whose con-
cealed wisdom shines in critical situations.  
Clever brothers display characteristics favoured in the West – rationality, dili-
gence, reliability, and Ivan boasts idleness and inability to complete mundane tasks. 
However, the older brothers’ practical and rational approach harbours obtuseness, 
inability to think outside the box, self-centredness. Pragmatic and callous, they are 
ever ready to harm their younger brother in order to prevent him from overshadow-
ing their own performance. 
Through these and similar stories, XX century Russian pre-school children 
learned to value wit and intuitive insight as preferred epistemological faculties and 
as foundations of morality. They also learned to treat rationality and premeditated 
planning, which allegedly entail obtuseness and emotional detachment, with suspi-
cion and distrust. 
Metaphorical riddles, liberally offered in Russian fairytales, test Ivan’s and other 
characters’ wisdom and wit. By solving riddles, fairy tales protagonists gain power 
and wealth, and young children in XX century Russia regularly received a powerful 
dose of these accounts as Russian fairy tales, edited by Afanasiev (1957-1958), were 
a major source of pre-school reading in the second part of the XX century. 
The author recalls teaching Russian to a British GCSE student who was unable 
to understand the meaning of a metaphorical riddle in Russian, even after extensive 
explanations. The riddle was: “Two brothers live on opposite sides of the road yet 
never see each other.” The answer to the riddle was “eyes” but the fifteen-year-old 
who was a pupil at a selective school at the time and subsequently became an under-
graduate student at Cambridge University and a legal professional afterwards, hope-
lessly failed to see the connection between “brothers” and “eyes”. “If some things 
are eyes, they cannot be brothers, and if some things are brothers, they cannot be 
eyes”, she insisted. To her, who approached every piece of information with meticu-
lous scrutiny, the metaphor riddle presented an unmanageable conceptual leap.           
Russian children in the XX century were exposed to hosts of metaphor riddles 
and from early years could effortlessly make an immediate conceptual connection 
between a white tablecloth and snow; running horse and thunder; white sheep and 
teeth; black cow and nightfall. Intuition, mental sharpness and wit, the spectacular 
instantaneity of producing a unique and unexpected, correct answer—these were 
cognitive qualities that riddles advocated. Inability to appreciate or engage with this 
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form of wisdom was seen negatively from the Russian perspective. The English 
student would probably understand the meaning of the “eyes as brothers” riddle after 
a lecture about the nature, purpose and structure of metaphor riddles. This, however, 
would still be disappointing to a Russian because the latter would expect her – or 
any other reasonably intelligent person – to grasp such things intuitively and instant-
ly, and someone requiring tedious and detailed explanations would be seen as ob-
tuse, slow thinking, dull-witted and small-minded.  
The valorisation of intuition (backed by common sense), as opposed to excessive 
(insensitive, obtuse) reasoning, is not uncommon in the West where it typically 
appears in science fiction narratives as human – cyborg oppositions. Gene Rodden-
berry's Star Treck stories rehearse this theme in situations where the capacity of 
artificial or dehumanised intelligence to negotiate typically human situations is put 
to the test. 
Android Lieutenant Commander Data, borg Seven of Nine, holographic charac-
ters may display an enhanced capacity for information processing and superior prac-
tical problem-solving skills, but they lack intuitive insight, sensitivity and compas-
sion when it comes to interacting with humans on an emotional level. Human beings 
and cyborgs do not connect intuitively; they do not gel in the way humans do with 
each other. Cyborgs fail to appreciate this side of humanity as humans remain, in the 
artificial humanoids’ view, illogical, self-contradictory, dysfunctional and ineffi-
cient. 
Star Treck romantic scenes are the catalysts of choice that reveal the discord be-
tween human and artificial minds: whilst humans wish to carefully explore an 
emerging romantic involvement with their would-be artificial partner, the latter asks 
blunt questions that embarrass the human, overtly comments on the stages of human 
mating rituals or directly invites their human would-be partner to copulate. This 
rationalisation of the sensitive subject matter destroys any possibility of a genuine 
romance. Paradoxically, the cyborg tries to negotiate the matter responsibly and 
meticulously, but his or her tactless logic and excessive rationalisation make them 
fail. Cold and insensitive, albeit intelligent, cyborgs clash with endearingly fallible 
and emotional humans and fail the “humanity” test. 
When Russians deal with Westerners, they often feel like Roddenberry's humans 
dealing with mechanistic cyborgs. During negotiations, Russians may be uneasy 
about Westerners’ insistence on paying attention to details in assessment and plan-
ning, and their preference for unnecessary rationalisation and tendency to verbally 
acknowledge every element in a process, as a computer would do. A similar cogni-
tive clash repeatedly appears in Start Treck episodes when Data annoyingly offers 
excessive details to his human colleagues, when they expect to receive only essential 
information. 
Just as humans in Star Treck, Russians prefer to acknowledge only those items 
that are, in their view, worth their special attention. The meticulous and painstaking 
96      Elena FELL Macro-reasoning and cognitive gaps… 
working out of practical details is a culturally repulsive practice for the Russians as a 
less-than-human, desensitised, computerised approach to the matter in hand.  
2. Good versus rational: valorisation of intuitive approach in literature
Whilst discussing Russian management culture, Holden Cooper, &  Carr confirm 
that even in business  Russians “base their decisions on intuition” and this “seriously 
conflicts with the western approach which emphasizes the gathering and analysis of 
hard facts” (Holden, Cooper, &  Carr, 1998, p. 37). 
In a more recent account, a well-travelled corporate manager usefully observes 
that “Russians do not tend to make a distinction between hard logic and emotion, 
which governs the Western culture. They value intuition rather than rationality” 
(Asefeso, 2013, p. 37).  
Indeed, Russians prefer to leap mentally from one important issue to another, 
leaving gaps of unacknowledged, unplanned and unforeseen material.  Hamburg & 
Poole (2010) confirm deep philosophical roots of Russian preference for intuition 
which goes hand-in-hand with “the apparent Russian aversion to handling detail” 
(Holden et al., 1998, p. 160) and extends into all areas of Russian social life. 
Numerous Russian cultural and literary phenomena that Soviet children and 
young people were exposed to in the XX century reinforce Ivan the Fool’s prefer-
ence for intuitive perception where the “good versus evil” opposition shifts towards 
“genuinely spirited versus callously rational”, with the “good” being synonymous 
with “genuinely spirited” and the “evil” being associated with callous rationality and 
emotional detachment. 
This opposition between practical, instrumental rationality and sincere intuitive 
insight is fiercely promoted in Russian classical literature, where authors ally them-
selves with those characters who display deep emotions and follow their heart. Rus-
sian writers portray practical, rational characters as insincere, incapable of commit-
ment and loyalty but capable of treachery instead. The authors strive to demonstrate 
that emotional detachment that accompanies rationality renders someone unfeeling, 
non-compassionate, and this desensitising effect of the rational approach to reality 
leads to immoral actions. 
Count Leo Tolstoy towers over the XX century’s country known to its citizens as 
“the state of workers and peasants”, his characters exemplifying values that were 
consistently promoted in soviet education. Pierre who acquires wealth by the only 
morally permissible method i.e. receiving it unexpectedly; Andrey who discovers 
the futility of social ambitions as he, wounded on the battlefield, gazes in the sky 
and, of course, Natasha, elevated to an ideal of femininity reiterated in the tonnes of 
10th grade’s  school essays. 
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Tolstoy’s most loved female character, neither intelligent nor beautiful, but ill-
mannered, impulsive, openhearted, charming and deeply emotional is opposed in 
War and Peace to her sister Vera—reasonable, practical, intelligent, well-mannered 
and diligent but abhorrent because she is cold, unloving, and because she makes 
sensible and impartial remarks, which make other people feel uncomfortable.  
Natasha’s every fault is excusable by her sincerity and capability for self-
forgetful love, and everything that Vera does is repugnant because her actions are 
calculated and purposeful; she is heartless. Even when Tolstoy follows the narrative 
of Natasha’s betrayal of her fiancé Andrey with seducer Anatol, the reader shares, 
anxiously, Natasha’s moods, doubts and her subsequent shame, and sympathizes 
with her. However, when the author depicts newly married Vera’s respectable house 
party, he demonstrates that the very fact that she and her husband make conscious 
efforts to plan and manage the event in the best possible way renders it shallow, 
pitiful and lifeless. 
XX century’s Soviet teenagers knew Natasha as the ideal woman, and Rostovs’ 
household, with the exception of emotionally impoverished Vera, as the ideal fami-
ly, where relationships were sincere, natural and based on disinterested love and 
unbounded parental generosity, without as much as a hint of practicality and calcula-
tion.  
The Rostovs lose their fortune partly as a direct consequence of the head of the 
family’s impracticality and lack of managerial skills. The moral of the story, howev-
er, is not that this approach is not good for the wellbeing of a family. Rather the true 
wellbeing of a family, founded on spontaneity, disinterestedness and love, not on 
strategic planning and calculation, is paramount and if losing one’s financial stabil-
ity is the price to be paid for happiness, than so be it.  
In Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment (studied in the 9th grade by sixteen-
year-old students), the opposition between benevolent intuition and malevolent ra-
tionality is pushed to its very limits. Student Raskolnikov commits a crime—kills a 
ghastly pawnbroker—in order to test a philosophical theory (whether he is an ex-
traordinary or ordinary man). This evil act directly derives from his intellectual 
search. However, his better, warm and kind-hearted, non-intellectual but conscien-
tious and loving self compels him to confess his crime and crave the punishment he 
deserves.  
Turgenev specifically addresses the intuition—rationality opposition in Rudin 
where the eponymous character manages to destroy another man’s romantic rela-
tionship by engaging the latter in the excessive rationalisation of both lovers’ feel-
ings: 
Rudin … destroyed my happiness … Rudin had no wish at all to do me any 
harm – quite the contrary! But because of his damned habit of pinning 
down every motion in life, his own as well as others, as if he were pinning 
down a butterfly, he set about explaining to both of us or own selves, our 
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relationship, how we should behave, despotically forcing us to give an ac-
count of our feelings and thoughts, praising us, blaming us, even starting a 
correspondence with us – imagine that! Well, he finally drove us complete-
ly out of our senses! (Turgenev, 1975, p. 101). 
Turgenev, a XIX century Russian aristocrat, who spent much of his time in 
France, Britain, and Germany, reinforces his allegiance to Russian values in Home 
of the Gentry. In this novel, (another piece of compulsory reading for Russian teen-
agers in the late XX century)  he demonstrates that the bearers of potentially malig-
nant, mechanistic rationality do not deserve the honour of being called true Russians 
– this evil comes from the West:
Ivan Petrovich returned to Russia an Anglomaniac. … [A] sour expression 
on his face, something both brusque and negligent in his manner, the pro-
nunciation of words through his teeth, a sudden wooden laugh … —
everything about him literally reeked of Great Britain  (Turgenev, 2007, pp. 
54 – 55). 
The author strives to show that adopting the Western tendency to critically eval-
uate phenomena is destructive for one’s identity as Russian.   Corrupted by the 
West, Turgenev’s character Ivan Petrovich falls out of love for his home country as 
“he was very dissatisfied with everything he saw – the absence of system particular-
ly aroused his bitter animosity” (Turgenev, 2007, p.55). Turgenev, following other 
Russian writers, endorses a view that rationalisation is not benign; it is destructive to 
one’s soul. 
Russians link morality with empathy, and empathy with intuition, an unmediated 
emotional connection with others and with the world. Rationality, analysis corrupt 
this intersubjective fusion, create a fissure between the perceiver and the perceived 
and endow the perceiver with the capability of emotional freedom, freedom from 
compassion and empathy. This emotional detachment makes someone free to choose 
whether to be moral or not whilst the immediate emphatic connection does not give 
a human being that choice and guides him or her to moral actions. 
3. Love and pigeons: rationality versus sincerity
In the Soviet era, the opposition between rationality and intuition continued as a 
major theme underpinning Russian culture, but contrasting Russian and Western 
ways in this context would not have been possible because there were no adequate 
personal contacts with Western people to exemplify this contrast. Instead, in the 
Soviet culture, urban and rural people embodied the opposition between reason and 
intuition. Coarse, sincere peasants, engaged in hard physical labour and partaking of 
the simple and palpable goodness emanating from nature and domestic animals were 
shown to have a moral superiority over sophisticated and polished, yet unnatural, 
demanding and cold-hearted city professionals. 
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In the film Love and Pigeons (1984) Raisa Zaharovna, personnel officer and a 
classy, cultured woman seduces Vasiliy, peasant and factory worker. Vasiliy, im-
pressed by his sophisticated lover’s accounts of fashionable city life leaves his wife 
and three children and moves in Raisa’s apartment. Eventually, he realises that a 
worthy and happy life is not possible with sleek and glossy Raisa but only with his 
peasant wife Nadezhda (whose volatile character had contributed to him falling for 
Raisa’s city charm in the first place). The plot intensifies as Nadezhda has blazing 
rows with polite Raisa, and Vasiliy tries to win Nadezhda back. The film demon-
strates an absolute moral superiority and spiritual beauty of grossly ignorant, squeal-
ing and rude but honest and genuine Nadezhda over the refined, polite and well-
mannered, underhanded seducer Raisa. 
This much-loved film and many others confirmed to Russian younger viewers 
that sincerity and spiritual goodness may be incompatible with politeness because 
sincerity is validated by the spontaneity of expression, and politeness is a feature of 
controlled, rationally choreographed behaviour; politeness, thus understood, equals 
falsehood and hypocrisy.  
In accordance with this worldview, Western-style courtesy, controlled facial ex-
pressions (e.g. social smiling) and wordiness are questionable as qualities of an 
underhanded “serpent” that employs mind-manipulating techniques, whilst a person 
of integrity would speak plainly, openly and to the point because he or she has noth-
ing to hide. 
Western culture is not a stranger to the similar vision of social posturing, where 
being honest with one’s feelings, and one’s endearing simplicity and naiveté are 
valued over intellect and self-control. In the recent remake of Dad’s Army (2016), 
Rose Winters, intellectually superior and sleek German spy, loses to the group of 
old, naïve but righteous Home Guards and their unfashionably dressed wives. Think 
of this unlikely story, and possibly of Bridget Jone’s parrhesiastic honesty delight-
fully clashing with Mark Darcy’s dry comportment, remove the humorous element, 
and you will get close to the Russian culture’s perspective on social values and 
communication patterns.  
4. Macro-reasoning versus micro-reasoning
Westerners make great efforts to focus on the matter in hand and explore it fun-
damentally. Processes that lead to results are as important for Westerners as results 
themselves; the result appears to be part of a process, its final stage. Russians value 
results over processes and, whilst focussing their attention on the result they, from 
the Westerners’ point of view, fail to take into account important details of the pro-
cess or muddle those details up. As Holden et al. note, “Russians, even at the height 
of negotiation, are easily swung into conversational digressions; or they go off into 
‘non-listening’ mode” (Holden et al., 1998, p. 155).  
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     Russians may offer proposals or plans containing conceptual leaps, and Western-
ers may become increasingly frustrated when their attempts to seek out clarifications 
are met with the impossibility to fill these cognitive lacunae because Russian-style 
communication has no provision for verbalising that much material but allows for 
unacknowledged elements to remain unacknowledged. Westerners’ attempts to 
communicate and discuss situations, plans or events on a detailed level are chal-
lenged by Russians ignoring the detailing, skipping particulars, jumping to conclu-
sions, refusing to elaborate important finer points and failing to engage adequately 
with Westerners’ information material taking no account of important nuances and 
misinterpreting data. 
As far as Russians are concerned, Westerners’ communication skills need im-
proving, not theirs. From Russian stakeholders’ position, the discrepancy affecting 
communication between Westerners and themselves is due to the former demon-
strating a frustrating cognitive deficiency whereby they seem to fail to grasp instant-
ly and intuitively obvious things that should require no specific verbalization. Rus-
sians are bewildered by the Western-style preference for detailing and their “obtuse” 
demands for the explanation of the obvious.  Whilst Westerners think that they are 
being thorough, Russians think that the Westerners procrastinate, create unnecessary 
and lengthy information processing activities, which result in delays and increased 
financial cost.  
Symbolic communication-related imagery that appeals to the Russian way of 
reasoning would include Occam's razor, calling spade a spade, cutting the Gordian 
knot, and Crystal Mark; also, “Speech is silver; silence is golden” is one of their 
favourite proverbs. However, it would be wrong to assume that the key feature here 
is the oversimplification of subject matter and that Russians favour a primitive vi-
sion of social reality while Westerners develop an elaborate view. Rather it could be 
said that Russians mentally condense reality into clotted material, and give their 
mindful attention to clots but not to the surrounding fluid.  
Westerners tend to mentally dilute reality expanding their vision of it to include 
finer details but this approach is not justifiable, as far as the Russians are concerned. 
Where a Russian, armed with common sense and trust in his or her intuition, would 
(metaphorically speaking) make a step, a Westerner would want to account for  leg 
muscles making certain contractions; the colour of the clothing that envelopes the 
legs; knees and ankles circumference and so on—a fatiguing list of facts, which are 
all relevant to someone making a step, but which should be disregarded as discuss-
ing them interferes with the very act of making a step.    
5. Motherland as a cognitive lacuna
Cognitive lacunae as epistemological gaps corresponding to the unacknowledged 
subject matter in Russian style communications do not constitute a cognitive vacu-
um. These gaps are not gaping wounds in the fabric of thought and communication; 
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they are filled with emotions, feelings, instinctive or learnt motor activity, imagina-
tion, abstract ideas, opinions and beliefs. 
The largest cognitive lacuna that Russians themselves are immensely proud of 
(and fervently protect from rationalization) is the idea of Russia itself.  Winston 
Churchill could not have found a better way to flatter Russians than saying that 
“[Russia] is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” (Churchill, 1939). 
Grand, spanless, powerful and essentially unfathomable—these are concepts that 
reflect the Russians’ own vision of their country. 
Rather than engaging rationally and critically with Russia’ role and her history, 
Russians refer to their country mostly in grandiloquent terms drawing on Tyutchev’s 
poem written in 1866: 
Russia is a thing of which  
the intellect cannot conceive.  
Hers is no common yardstick. 
You measure her uniquely:  
in Russia, you believe!  
(Tyutchev, 2000) 
 “Motherland” was one of the first words that all 1st grade 7-year-old children in 
late XX century Soviet Russia learnt to write, and the first meaningful texts they 
mastered were these: “Our Motherland is USSR” (Mikhalkov, 1985, p. 3) and 
“USSR is the Country of the Soviets. In our country, all are equal. The Country of 
the Soviets is great and beautiful. Glory to the Country of the Soviets!” (Mikhalkov, 
1985, p. 54). The glorification of Soviet Motherland continued throughout all years 
of mainstream education warranting unqualified love, trepidation and lifelong devo-
tion.  
Motherland, in its XX century Russian interpretation, appears as a depersonal-
ised geo-political, spiritually superior heterogeneous unity that manifests the ulti-
mate universal goodness, embodied in the gems of Russian literature, art and scien-
tific achievements, natural world and mundane objects: soil, trees, fields, water and 
air, food, elements of material culture. 
As far as the XX century Russian educators were concerned, the ultimate unsur-
passable goodness of Motherland permeated all levels of reality and included the 
government structure, wealth of natural resources, outstanding natural beauty, the 
vastness of space, glorious history, Russia’s special role in the world, the martyrdom 
of her heroes and her moral and spiritual supremacy on the world stage.  
It may seem odd that is was – and still is – possible to prevent Russian people 
from taking a critical, rational approach to such an important subject matter as their 
own country. The answer to that is that the glorification of Russia as heterogeneous 
unity directly reflects on Russian persons as integral components of that heterogene-
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ity. The greater Russian people’s pride in their country is, the more important they 
feel as concrete individuals, as Russian citizens. 
Honneth emphasizes the importance of societal recognition for a person’s well-
being asserting that “a recognitional stance enjoys a genetic and categorical priority 
over all attitudes towards the self and the world” (Honneth, 2005, p. 109). 
Russian people’s communication behaviour proves Honneth’s point, as the glori-
fication of Russia elevates its citizens to great heights qua Russians, fills them with 
unbounded pride in themselves and the feeling of existential and moral superiority – 
satisfaction so strong and jubilant, that Russian people resist any external influence 
that could undermine this empowering, addictive feeling.  
Russia is often personified as “Mother”. Russian people – “her children” – are 
expected to love Mother Russia wholeheartedly, with trepidation and gratitude. 
In the Russian worldview, it would be a blasphemy for children to think rational-
ly and critically about their Mothers, who suffered for them in childbirth, cared for 
them and sacrificed everything for them. The feeling of one’s guilt and debt owed to 
one’s parents, especially Mother, was purposefully cultivated in the XX century 
Russian culture, as seen from the words of a widely performed song “Parental 
home” (Lev Leschenko - Roditelskiy dom, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dTnOPUJRhBk):   
Bow down to the ground to your Mother, 
And to your Father, you must bow too. 
We owe them, and this debt is unplayable. 
Remember this faithfully all your life.    
(M. Ryabinin, translation mine – E. F.) 
The debt to one’s Mother is impossible to repay, and this impossibility asserts 
the child’s perennial guilt on a metaphysical level. Mother’s sacrifice and suffering 
make her morally superior to her children, and render anything she may do to them, 
not only excusable but also justifiable. The children must constantly try to redeem 
themselves from their guilt by indisputable submission to her will and unqualified 
devotion.  
By associating Russia with Mother, Russian people are forced to remember eve-
rything they owe to their country, and this guilt-laden, euphoric love in itself ex-
cludes the possibility of a rational approach. Even when Mother Russia is not kind 
to her children, she is worshipped by them as they are obliged to accept everything 
that emanates from her without questioning: 
Mother Russia! For you are my songs!  
Silent, stern mother,  
Let me cry over my wretched life 
Here in deeper darkness, in darker obscurity.  
(Belyiy, 1908, “From the train window”. Translation mine – E. F.) 
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The only way to redeem oneself completely from the metaphysical guilt of being 
a child is to give one’s life whilst defending one’s Mother from her enemies.  Thus 
the most honourable and dominant position in the Soviet society was reserved for 
the military whose noble role was to defend the Motherland from potential outside 
invaders and to be ready to sacrifice their lives for her.  
6. Regimental style communications
Mandatory military service meant that in the Soviet Union, being a true man was 
synonymous with being a soldier. Boys from early years were prepared for the two-
year military service, and those who successfully completed it were given preferen-
tial treatment when applying for prestigious university places and typically had 
smoother career paths than other categories of Soviet citizens. 
Many professionals who currently occupy influential positions in  Russian socie-
ty, had acquired their managerial and communication styles in the Armed Forces 
and subsequently used them in their workplaces, with other people copying their 
behavioural patterns.  
Russian society today displays a regimental character with military style com-
munications dominating both professional world and civic discourse. These types of 
communications presuppose a downward dissemination of information, from the 
leader to his or her subordinates and exclude (or make very difficult) spontaneous 
communications (such as feedback) upwards. The leader is vocal when he or she 
issues an order. Subordinates are expected to respond by following the order, with-
out discussion, and this type of relationship contributes to further communication 
gaps, which are filled with subordinates’ actions rather than their words. 
Speaking of cross-cultural communications, Holden et al. note that Russians’ 
aim is to achieve an absolute advantage, rather than consensus, in negotiations: 
As in their political and military behaviour, so in their international busi-
ness activities, Russians seek to secure and keep absolute advantage. … 
Russians … can only conceive of negotiating on a win-to-lose basis. The 
notion of negotiation as a means of sharing benefits with business partners 
is far from being a commonly accepted principle (Holden et al, 1998, 
p.161- 162).
Whilst Holden’s discourse primarily concerns international business, his obser-
vations can be confidently applied to Russians’ intracultural communication.  
On the level of personal interactions, where those occupying leaders’ positions 
verbally assert their domination, functional and satisfying dialogues between people 
are a luxury; a lot of talking can be heard in the Russian environment but these are 
mainly monologues, not dialogues. Information moves in unidirectional streams: 
from the leader to subordinates; from writer to readers; from parent to child; from 
teacher to pupils. At times no verbal response or feedback is expected at all, and 
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listeners (e.g. in meetings) would listen attentively and absorb information. It is 
often expected that information will be acted on, not responded to verbally. This 
highlights another trait in Russian people’s communication behaviour: they have at 
their disposal a limited range of communication patterns, as many communications 
(including in the family) are hierarchically structured and discourage the possibility 
of a dialogue that would generate genuinely new, unexpected meanings rather than 
evoking expected and prescribed responses.  
Moreover, in Russia, interlocutors tend not to adjust the tone of their voice to 
another person’s tone, which creates awkwardness and stops the conversation from 
progressing. Holden’s observation that in communication, Russians stakeholders’ 
aim not to reach consensus but gain an absolute advantage, correlates with the fact 
that Russians like to respond abruptly to questions. They feel that by killing a con-
versation, they have achieved an absolute advantage over another party, and this 
kind of situation happens in both formal and informal settings. As far as Russians 
are concerned, killing a conversation by putting someone in their place constitutes 
success in communication, not a failure. 
7. Shared spiritual medium and shifts of meaning
How do Russian people communicate with each other and what makes their 
communication work? Rather than investing most of their communicative efforts in 
dialogues and words that convey and generate new meanings, as Westerners do, 
Russian people fall back on non-verbal communication, which largely consists of 
actively sharing the same spiritual medium. Russians’ sense of unity is achieved by 
the shared euphoric feeling of belonging to the unique, great and sacred country; by 
gathering around a festive table with family and friends; by jointly enjoying the 
atmosphere of a public event. Sharing food, in particular, is a powerful communica-
tion tool. This kind of communication is prior to any specific conversations and is 
more metaphysical and existential than rational and logical. This metaphysical 
communication, communication via belonging counterbalances deficiencies of ver-
bal communication and dissolves to some extent internal societal conflicts between 
different categories of Russian people. 
As Holden et al. note, “Russian hospitality is legendary” (Holden et al. 1998, p. 
158). Sharing and appreciating the same type of food (and vodka drinking) creates a 
common spiritual medium that can instantly transform an outsider into an ally. Ac-
cepting and praising the food that has been offered instantly creates a sense of har-
monising unity capable of dissolving the awkwardness that the lack of the construc-
tive dialogue creates.  
On the other hand, if a Western guest remains emotionally reserved whilst eating 
food, this creates awkwardness and hinders cross-cultural communication. Russians’ 
striving to achieve absolute advantage can be uncovered here: by offering best pos-
sible food to Western guests, they strive to defeat them spiritually, as the guests are 
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expected to surrender their will to the host’s. Therefore, “[e]xuberant hospitality; 
sudden displays of emotion; descent into sentimentality; seemingly inexplicable 
switchings of position and mood” (Holden et al. 1998, p. 164) are amongst notable 
features of Russian partners’ mindset that should be taken into account by Western 
stakeholders.  
Shared spiritual media that unite Russians include the Russian-specific vision of 
the world and communications between people, heavily loaded with emotive conno-
tations. These emotive connotations are not separated from objective data and ap-
pear to the Russians as part of the objective characteristics of subject matter. The 
structure of the Russian language, which is itself a spiritual medium uniting all Rus-
sian speakers, facilitates this approach.  Russian is an extreme example of a synthet-
ic fusional language (Shalonova,  2009) and as such entails the possibility of infinite 
words formation via adding suffixes and prefixes to the word root, which creates a 
multitude of words merging one’s emotive responses with the subject matter.  
Russian language word formation allows portraying one’s subjective view as the 
object’s objective properties. For example, one of the Russian words for vodka “vo-
dochka” contains “vod” the word root that denotes the substance and “chka”, a di-
minutive tenderising suffix that reflects the speaker’s loving attitude to the sub-
stance. However, in the Russian mindset, it is not the speaker’s attitude to the sub-
stance that the word “vodochka” denotes but the property of the substance, which is 
objectively appealing and lovely.  
The Russian linguistic division of nouns into masculine, feminine and neuter 
contributes to the mix-up of emotions and facts by “animating” the world in which 
Russian people live as most objects and phenomena are either “he” or “she” to the 
Russians who, from their early years, learn to see masculine virility and feminine 
grace in inanimate world. In later years, Russian people learn to dissociate gramma-
tical gender from biological sex to some extent but this dissociation is often dissol-
ved in their vision of the world. The Russian catchphrase “War has no female face” 
is due to this mix-up of grammatical gender and biological sex : Russian word “war” 
“voyna” is feminine, so Russians would normally expect it to display feminine fea-
tures and the fact that it does not seems to be an abnormality that requires a special 
acknowledgement.      
The inadvertent blending of emotions and facts in linguistic exchanges contrib-
utes to emotional bonds that resist rationalisation. This works especially well when 
the emotive response that corresponds to the person whom the speaker is addressing 
is overtly assigned to the object that the speaker talks about instead. The example 
below demonstrates the difficulty of translating and hence understanding these im-
portant subtleties.  
Let us consider two Russian phrases, which contain an offer of a glass of milk. 
1. Пей молоко. [Pey moloko]  2. Попей молочка. [Popey molochka]
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Both these phrases can be translated literally as “Drink milk”. Their core gram-
matical structure informs that the offering is made to one person who is addressed 
informally. The situation could refer to Mother offering a glass of milk to her son. 
However, the two phrases are loaded with different connotations. A more precise, 
grammar-sensitive translation would be this: 
1. Drink milk. 2. Have a little drink of nice milk.
The first phrase is stern, uncaring. The second phrase entails diminutive and tender-
ising elements incorporated in the words referring to the act of drinking and the 
milk. But it is not the milk or the act of drinking that Mother thinks tenderly of, but 
her son. However, as per the Russian cultural and linguistic tradition, the love for 
her son is not expressed in tender words directed to him but in tender words directed 
to the milk. This shift of emotive connotation from the person to an object remains 
unacknowledged and both the Mother and her son would say that she refers tenderly 
to the milk. Her tenderness for her son thus falls in the cognitive lacuna filled with a 
warm, cosy feeling enveloping them both. If the first phrase is used, the son instant-
ly knows that there is something wrong, perhaps he is in deep trouble as the insensi-
tive and stern reference to milk is actually directed to him. This blending of facts 
and emotions combined with the unacknowledged shift of reference from the desig-
nated object to environment contributes to the further refutation of logic, structure 
and analysis being applied to human interactions. 
If the translator of these phrases ignored grammar and decided to offer a culture-
sensitive translation instead, he or she would uncover this shift by translating these 
phrases like this: 
1. Drink your milk. 2. Have some milk, darling.
However, a translator would typically prefer to be faithful to the grammar and 
language overtly displayed, and so generally, translations from Russian into English 
strip Russian phrases of their important intracultural meaning, as this example 
demonstrates.    
8. A glimpse into the future and concluding remarks
As new generations of young Russians become more socially and politically ac-
tive, will the cultural features that shaped post-Soviet Russians’ communication 
styles lose their significance and will the communication problems associated with 
these features eventually expire? 
Post-Soviet Russians who were brought up in the XX century Soviet Union and 
who dominate the Russian society now, do not just do business and politics; they 
also teach children and young people. How do their students respond to their teach-
ing?  
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Russian young people’s opinions about their country, recorded in a sociological 
survey of 2015, could be useful in our trying to get a glimpse of Russia’s future.  
Students (predominantly 18-21 year-olds) from nine universities across Russia were 
asked to define “patriotism” – one of the key concepts that permeate Russian educa-
tion culture – by using available options. “Being proud of Russia’s culture” was the 
leading answer selected by 45.6% of the respondents, with 40.1% selecting “Pride in 
great achievements of their country”. “Obeying laws and fulfilling civic obligations” 
was selected by 35.3 %, and 32.5 % defined patriotism as “defending their country 
with arms in their hands”. 24.5% of the respondents chose “active fight against in-
ternal threat” and 22.3 % selected “having a belief in the great future of their coun-
try”. The least popular answer was “experiencing nostalgia when far away from 
Motherland” (5.1%), and this seems to be the only significant difference between 
Soviet people’s attitude towards Motherland, which they reportedly longed for when 
abroad, and the young Russian citizens of the globalized world. However, as other 
responses indicate, Russia’s young people effortlessly engage with the nationalist 
rhetoric initially endorsed by the culture of the XX century Soviet Union (Nauchno-
tekhnicheskii otchet po sotsiologicheskomu oprosu «Issledovanie budushchego», 
2016). 
The author also asked educators from three institutions in St. Petersburg (State 
Government-funded Establishment of General Educational, Secondary School № 
643 and Youth Centre Ligovo youth clubs “Alpha” and “Mayak”) to find out how 
school age children engage with the concept “Motherland”.  Seventy pupils aged six 
to thirteen produced their responses, which included references to visual imagery, 
concepts, spontaneously generated statements. The responses, collected in January-
February 2017 individually in order to prevent the children from influencing each 
other, were as follows.  
52 pupils’ responses included geographical references such as “birthplace”, 
“home”, “my city”, “St. Petersburg”, “Russia”. Six children associated Motherland 
specifically with “Mother”; six linked this concept with “family” and one with 
“school”. Nature-related imagery, including “silver birch tree” (which appeared 7 
times), “fields”, “snow”, “blue sky”, were present in 12 pupils’ responses. The “de-
fence of Motherland” theme, reflected in such concepts as “soldiers”, “tanks”, 
“ships”, “great power” appeared in the responses of 9 pupils, predominantly boys. 
This latter  theme was demonstrated most notably in an 8-year-old boy’s response 
who said: “[Motherland is] where I live, your home, for which you are prepared to 
give your life so that your descendants would know that they too will be able to give 
their lives for their Motherland” (Translation mine – E. F.) 
We can see that Russian children and young people, despite the diversity of their 
responses, readily engage with the nationalist rhetoric that defined XX century Sovi-
et culture. According to Russian teachers, the idea of patriotism is currently being 
reinforced in education programs. Interestingly, the Russian word “Motherland” 
appears in Russian native language usage 30 times more often than the word “home-
land” in English (Radbil, 2010, p. 118). 
108     Elena FELL Macro-reasoning and cognitive gaps… 
Conclusion 
It is possible that the cultural features that determined post-Soviet Russian peo-
ple’s worldview and communication style will not necessarily expire as the young 
generations of Russians supposedly acquire new cultural traits. It is possible that the 
Soviet legacy will live on, and if this is so, then understanding Soviet culture and 
values will remain important for years to come.   
The author would like to end this paper by presenting two examples of Russian 
children’s artwork that depict their country and its history. 
Figure 1. “Mother Russia” by A. Schukina, 13 y.o. (2016). Saint Petersburg Youth Centre 
“Ligovo”, club “Alfa” (teacher T. V. Orlovskaya) 
Figure 1. “The heroic days of the siege” by A. Kudinova, 10  y.o. (2016). Saint Petersburg 
Youth Centre “Ligovo”, club “Mayak” (teacher I. V. Mirenkova) 
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